proposal of a "common sense" psychology in which people's "naive theories" are central to a scientific understanding of social phenomena is discussed. The "naive theory" construct is discussed in relation to similar concepts such as lay beliefs, intuitive theories, and implicit theories. Special attention is given to the use of the term "implicit" in social psychological contexts. Finally, the contributions to this special issue on "Naive Theories and Social Judgment" are described. In these articles, a variety of leading scholars discuss and/or present research that goes beyond the study of the content of naive theories in order to investigate the impact of naive theories on related perceptions and behaviors.
In the 1950s, Fritz Heider issued a call for the study of "common-sense" psychology in which peoples' "naive" understandings would play a central role in building a scientific theory of interpersonal relations and other social phenomena (Heider, 1958 ). Heider's case for such an enter prise rested on two primary arguments: (a) that peoples' naive under standings of psychological phenomena included many truths that could form the basis of scientific theories, and (b) that common-sense psychol ogy forms an important part of the phenomena of interest because it guides both peoples' perceptions of others and peoples' behavior toward others. That is, Heider noted that "one can talk about a 'naive psycholo gy' that gives us principles we use to construct our picture of the social environment and that guides our reactions to it. An explanation of this behavior, must therefore deal with common-sense psychology, regard less of whether its assumptions and principles prove valid under scien-tific scrutiny" (p. 5). Thus, Heider foreshadowed a variety of more recent commentaries on the "naive theories" that people hold, noting that, although these theories might in many circumstances be erroneous, people nonetheless act on these naive beliefs about how the social world around them works (cf., Anderson, Krull, & Weiner, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegener & Petty, 1997 ). Heider's (1958) Anderson et al., 1996; Fletcher & Fincham, 1991; Kruglanski, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Trope & Liberman, 1996) , people have been widely characterized as motivated to develop "correct" perceptions of themselves and others (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Petty & Ca cioppo, 1986) , and much of the pursuit of these perceptions is characterized as entailing hypothesis generation and testing (e.g., see Kruglanski, 1989; Trope & Liberman, 1996) . What do people do with these theories once they have been formulated? Heider's (1958) (Piatt, 1964) regardless of whether or not people realize that this is the case. To be sure, such "naive theories" are likely to be rather intuitive and are formulated by lay perceivers, so there is no inherent conflict between use of these terms and the "naive theory" formulation. However, use of the term "implicit" theory can at times lead to potential confusions.
Although the term "implicit" theory has a long history, especially as it pertains to implicit personality theory (e.g., Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954) , recent work in cognitive and social psychology has used the term "im plicit" to refer to the inability of people to report the existence or operation of some entity or past experience (e.g., Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992; for a review, see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) . For many of the naive theories addressed in the articles of this special issue (and the existing literature more generally), however, people seem able to report the content of those theories, and thus measures used to identify the theories have been (and can be) rather direct. Within the recent discussions of "implicit social cognition" (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) such theories would be characterized as explicit rather than implicit (though they are still "naive" and generated by lay perceivers). There are also a number of issues not previously addressed regarding "implicit" social cognition. For Greenwald & Banaji, 1995 Russell, Fernandez-Dols, Manstead, & Wellenkamp, 1995) , attribution (e.g., Fletcher & Fincham, 1991; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Morris & Peng, 1994) , and concept formation (e.g., Wisiniewski & Medin, 1994) to education (e.g., Mintzes, Trowbridge, Arnaudin, & Wandersee, 1991; Wiser, 1995) , health (e.g., Furnham & McDermott, 1994; Sigelman, Estrada, Derenowski, & Woods, 1996) , consumer behavior (e.g., Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994; Snell, Gibbs, & Varey, 1995; Friestad & Wright, 1994) and beyond (for a wide-ranging discussion, see Furnham, 1988) . As noted earlier, in much of this existing research, the focus has been on content of naive theories held by social perceivers. Consistent with Heider's (1958) comments, the work dis cussed in this special issue (and ongoing in a number of research labs) extends outside the assessment of theory content to map out the influ ence of these naive theories on related perceptions and behaviors.
It is our hope that this special issue will foster the inclusion of perceiv ers' naive theories in models of human thought and behavior. We are encouraged that researchers and theorists have taken up Heider's (1958) call to include a "common sense" or "naive" psychology in the develop ment of a scientific understanding, and we believe that future conceptual and empirical developments will include additional refinements regard ing when and how perceivers' naive theories impact social judgments and behavior.
